

peter  
carrier

## fiksiranje sjećanja

## memorial fixation

spomenik ubijenim  
europskim židovima u  
berlinu

the monument for the  
murdered jews of europe  
in berlin

▼ Planovi za *Spomenik ubijenim europskim Židovima* ili *Spomenik holokaustu*<sup>1</sup> u središtu Berlina (sl. 1) potaknuli su jednu od najžešćih i najduljih rasprava o spomeničkom nasljeđu i predstavljanju Drugoga svjetskoga rata u povijesti Savezne Republike Njemačke. Nakon preimenovanja ulica i uklanjanja ili modificiranja spomenika u istočnom dijelu grada od 1989. i uporedo s pregovorima o mogućoj rekonstrukciji arhitektonskih simbola Wilhelminskog carstva, rasprava o planiranom *Spomeniku holokaustu* pokazuje problematičnu kulturnu i simboličku transformaciju ovoga grada vezanu uz njegovo ponovno ustoličenje kao sjedišta vlade 1999. godine.

Ovaj je spomenik u osnovi mjesto od povijesnog i političkog značaja, izlika za izražavanje i razmjenu javnog mišljenja o genocidu. No pozornost koju pobuđuje također proizlazi iz njegove umjetničke dimenzije, jer nezamislive patnje žrtava genocida i preživjelih od 1940. definiraju "estetski" oblik komemoracije fiksiran u kamenu i u simboličkom ritualu. Jedinstvena kombinacija političke i estetske dimenzije historijskog spomenika bila je izazov umjetnicima i arhitektima da stvore objekt koji ne samo da će izraziti političku ili historijsku viziju svojih kreatora, nego koji će biti znakovit i prihvatljiv širokom dijelu društva. Međutim, trenutno ne postoje kolektivno prihvatljive konvencije koje bi odredile oblik, motive, teme ili poruke javnih spomenika. "Budućnost javnog spomenika", prema Sergiuszu Michalskom, "danas je upitnija no ikada."<sup>2</sup> U najboljem slučaju, tendencije se kreću od "prolaznih" spomenika, "neželjenih" spomenika, do posvemašnjeg odustajanja od spomenika (kao što je to bio slučaj u Velikoj Britaniji nakon Drugoga svjetskog rata). Uobičajeniji je trend restauracije historijskih oblika poput pompoznijskih figurativnih reljefa koji se uobičajio u Moskvi od 1991. godine. Često se rješenje ove eksplozije prihvaćenih stilova traži u upotrebi konceptualnih tehnika u "protu -spomenicima". Oni su oblikovani ne da bi komemorirali prošlost, nego da bi isprovocirali promatrača na razmišljanje o procesu i tradiciji same komemoracije.

U praksi, međutim, veliki broj od preko 500 spomeničkih projekata prijavljenih na natječaj za berlinski *Spomenik holokaustu*, te odlučno, ali nedosljedno nastojanje stručnjaka da odaberu oblik, pokazuju kako stručnjaci i dalje na spomenike gledaju kao na održivi oblik komemoracije.

Činjenica da spomenici Drugom svjetskom ratu u Njemačkoj pobuđuju značajne

● Plans for a *Monument for the Murdered Jews of Europe* or *Holocaust Monument*<sup>1</sup> in central Berlin (Fig. 1) have given rise to one of the most intense and prolonged debates over the memorial legacy and representations of the Second World War in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. Following the renaming of streets and the removal or modification of monuments in the eastern sector of the city since 1989, and parallel to negotiations over the possible reconstruction of architectural symbols of the Wilhelmine empire, the debate over the planned Holocaust Monument exemplifies the problematical cultural and symbolic transformation of this city in connection with its reinstatement as the seat of government in 1999.

This monument is essentially a site of historical and political significance, a pretext for the expression and exchange of public attitudes towards the genocide. Yet the fascination it arouses also derives from its artistic dimension, for the unimaginable suffering of victims and survivors of the genocide of the 1940s defies "aesthetic" forms of commemoration fixed in stone and symbolic ritual. The unique combination of political and aesthetic dimensions of historical monuments challenged artists and architects to produce objects which do not merely convey the political or historical visions of their makers, but which are meaningful and acceptable for a broad section of society. However, there are at present no collectively accepted conventions determining the forms, motifs, themes or messages of public monuments. "The future of the public monument," according to Sergiusz Michalski, "is now more open than ever."<sup>2</sup> At most, one may identify tendencies, ranging from 'ephemeral' monuments, 'unwanted' monuments or even the renunciation of monuments altogether (as in Britain following the Second World War). More common is the trend towards the restoration of historical forms, such as the pompous figurative effigies in Moscow adopted since 1991. A frequent solution to this explosion of accepted styles is the use of conceptual techniques in "counter-monuments". These are designed not to commemorate the past but to provoke spectators to reflect on the process and tradition of commemoration itself.

In practice, however, the large number of over 500 monumental projects submitted in competitions for the Berlin Holocaust Monument, and the determined but inconclusive efforts of experts to select a design, suggests that experts continue to consider monuments a viable form of commemoration. And the

▼●  
<sup>1</sup> Ovaj spomenik ima dva imena. Usporedna upotreba službenog naslova i mnogo kraćeg i uobičajenijeg termina *Spomenik holokaustu* ukazuje na diskrepanciju između organizatorovih namjera i popularnog razumijevanja spomenika. Vidi: Salomon Korn, *Mit falschem Etikett*, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4. 9. 97. , s. 6.

<sup>2</sup> Sergiusz Michalski, *Public Monuments, Art in Political Bondage 1870 -1997*, London: Reaktion Books, 1998., s. 10.

<sup>1</sup> This monument has two names. The parallel usage of the official title and the shorter and more common term "Holocaust Denkmal" demonstrates the discrepancy between the organisers' intentions and the popular understanding of the monument. Cf. Salomon Korn, *Mit falschem Etikett*, Frankfurter Rundschau, 4.9.97, p. 6.


<sup>2</sup> Sergiusz Michalski, *Public Monuments. Art in Political Bondage 1870-1997*, London: Reaktion Books, 1998, p. 10.




1




2




3



4



5



6

sl.1: Mjesto pokraj rastućeg Trga Potsdamer u središtu Berlina 1999.  
*The site next to the rising Potsdamer Platz in central Berlin, 1999.*

sl.2: Mjesto javnog dijaloga: knjiga posjetitelja na izložbi modela odabranih za Muzej holokausta.  
*A site of public dialogue: the visitors' book at exhibition of models selected for the Holocaust Monument.*

sl.3: Eisenmanov prvonagrađeni dizajn.  
*The winning design by Peter Eisenman.*

sl.4: Dizajn Jochena Gerza prikazuje posjetiteljski centar, postavlja pitanje "zašto?" i prikazuje betonski temelj na kojem bi trebale stajati riječi posjetitelja.  
*Design by Jochen Gerz, showing a visitor's centre, posts bearing the word "why?", and a concrete base to be inscribed by words written by successive visitors.*

sl.5: Dizajn Daniel Libeskinda: pozitivna uloga "praznina" njegova Židovskog muzeja u blizini.  
*Design by Daniel Libeskind: a positive cast of the "voids" of his Jewish Museum nearby.*

sl.6: Dizajn Gesine Weinmiller prikazuje razlomljenu Davidovu zvijezdu u betonu.  
*Design by Gesine Weinmiller showing a fragmented David star in concrete.*

javne spekulacije, kako u privatnoj, tako i u javnoj sferi, dokaz je kako je ovaj tip komemoracije još uvijek održiv. Uzmemo li u obzir činjenicu da se spomenici danas tretiraju ozbiljno, ali i da je nemoguće dogovoriti se o jednom kolektivno prihvatljivom obliku, postavlja se pitanje kako umjetnici pristupaju ovom problemu pri oblikovanju spomenika? Odabiru li jednu tehniku iz suvremenog repertoara, polazeći od historijsko figurativne prezentacije, ironije, ili se, pak, općenito odriču oblikovanja spomenika? Sve su ove metode primijenjene za *Spomenik holokaustu*, premda nijedna nije kolektivno prihvatljiva.

U ovom ću eseju ukratko iznijeti povijest berlinskog spomenika, raspravljajući o tome kako javna umjetnost ne može biti interpretirana tek istraživanjem oblika, motiva i samoga žanra. Dakle, u obzir moramo uzeti sve javne sudionike uključene u proces stvaranja, odabiranja i primjene. Prema riječima povjesničara Jacquesa Le Goffa, "moramo "destruktuirati" dokumente kako bismo otkrili uvjete njihova nastanka"<sup>3</sup>. Spomenici - kao estetski dokumenti - društveni su fenomen koji se esencijalno može shvatiti kao žarišna točka dijaloga koja služi za izražavanje i reartikuliranje privatnoga i javnoga sjećanja. Njihova je funkcija kao takvih da djeluju na individualno i kolektivno sjećanje te da na njih djeluje sjećanje oblikovano tijekom međusobne komunikacije u javnoj sferi (sl. 2).

## Institucionaliziranje sjećanja. Povijest projekta

Dugotrajnost i emotivnost rasprave o *Spomenku holokaustu* karakterističan je primjer procesa kojim je nacionalno sjećanje u Njemačkoj institucionalizirano od 1989. godine. Konačno rješenje ovoga spora donijeli su parlamentarni zastupnici u lipnju 1999. Međutim, sama rasprava pokazuje način kojim je umjetnost, kao institucija sa svojim pravima, slično kao i drugi oblici povijesne transmisije poput dokumentarnog filma, novinarstva, povijesnih eseja i prava, postala glavni problem i usto je legitimno proglašena pogrešnim medijem komemoracije. Interakcija političara, umjetnika i arhitekata na temu javnih spomenika odražava proces institucionalizacije koji sadržava (prvo) oblike organizacija ili društvenih grupa koje predstavljaju specifične interese i (drugo) raznolikiju, ali ne manje značajnu "tipizaciju uobičajenih akcija"<sup>4</sup> s obzirom na javnu umjetnost.

fact that monuments in Germany relating to the Second World War attract intense public speculation in both the private and public spheres is evidence that this type of commemoration is still viable. Given the fact that monuments are today taken seriously, while it is impossible to agree upon a single collectively acceptable form, how do artists approach the problem of designing a monument? Do they select one technique from among the contemporary repertoire, resort to historical figurative representations, irony, or even renounce creating a monument altogether? All of these methods were proposed for the *Holocaust Monument* and none won collective approval.

In this essay, I will briefly trace the history of the Berlin monument, arguing that monumental public art cannot be interpreted by examining forms, motifs and genres alone. One must also take into account all public actors involved in the process of production, selection and implementation. In the words of the historian Jacques Le Goff, "one has to 'destructure' documents in order to reveal the conditions of their production".<sup>3</sup> Monuments - as aesthetic *documents* - are social phenomena that can be understood essentially as focal points of dialogue serving the expression and rearticulation of private and public memory. As such, their function is both to act upon individual and collective memory and to be acted upon *by* memory as it takes shape during interpersonal communication in the public sphere (Fig. 2).

## Institutionalising memory. A history of the project

The long duration and emotional nature of the debate over the *Holocaust Monument* offers a characteristic example of the process by which national memory has been institutionalized in Germany since 1989. The ultimate solution to the debate was implemented by members of parliament in June 1999. However, the debate itself illustrates the way in which art as an institution in its own right, in similar fashion to other forms of historical transmission such as documentary film, journalism, historical writings and the law, became a central issue and a legitimate yet ill-defined medium of commemoration. The interaction of politicians, artists and architects on the basis of public monuments reflects a process of institutionalization comprising (first) the formation of organizations or social groups representing specific interests and (second) the more diffuse, but no less significant "typification of habitualized actions"<sup>4</sup> with respect to public art.

Projekt izgradnje središnjeg *Spomenika holokaustu* iniciralo je 1988. godine udruženje *Perspektive Berlin*. Stvoren je širok institucionalni okvir kako bi se riješili sporovi i uspostavio dogovor: razne udruge su prikupljale peticije, potpise i donacije, a uslijedila je i serija umjetničkih natječajeva, parlamentarnih rasprava, diskusija u anketnoj komisiji te intervencija predsjednika Helmuta Kohla i Gerta Schrödera. Poništavanje prvog natječaja iz 1995. zbog nedostatka konsenzusa o radovima koji su ušli u uži izbor dovelo je do uvođenja novih institucionalnih mjera kako bi se stvorio društveni konsenzus: tri konferencije s preko devedeset stručnjaka i političara 1997., drugi natječaj 1998., izložba crteža i modela spomenika, serija od šest javnih razgovora s umjetnicima i arhitektima početkom 1998., susreti koje su organizirali crkva i političke udruge, kao i niz sjednica parlamentarnog Odbora za kulturu posvećenih spomeniku 1999. godine.

Umjetnici koji su 1995. pozvani da sudjeluju na natječaju su Christian Boltanski i Gerhard Merz, a na drugom natječaju 1997. bili su Jochen Gerz, Rachel Whiteread i arhitekti Daniel Libeskind i Peter Eisenman. Godine 1995. predloženo je 528 modela, a 1997. godine 28 modela (samo pozvani) pa su 1995. odabrana dva pobjednika, a 1997. četiri.

Ipak, suglasnosti nije bilo ni za jedan model. Proglašavanje više pobjednika, čime se javnosti ponudila mogućnost sudjelovanja u procesu odabira i pregovora na široko zasnovanom društvenom konsenzusu, zapravo je potaklo konflikt, a ne konsenzus. Nakon neriješenog rezultata drugog natječaja iz 1998., kada se ni prosudbeni odbor ni kritičari nisu mogli usuglasiti oko četiri modela iz užeg izbora, predložena je izrada modificirane verzije Serrinog i Eisenmanovog modela, polja stupaca visine između 0.5 i 7.5 metara, reduciranog s 4000 na 2700 (slika 3). Nadalje, sve predložene preinake prekršile su inicijalni princip apstraktnoga i čisto skulpturalnog spomenika dodajući mu institucionalnu organizaciju: Spielbergovu zbirku video zapisa svjedoka poznatu kao "Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation" (predložio Michael Naumanna), Muzej holokausta (Lea Rosh), Sveučilište židovskih studija (Andreas Nachama) ili zgradu koja sadrži knjižnicu, ogranak Leo Baeck Instituta i istraživački centar (Naumann/Eisenman). Konačna odluka iz lipnja 1999. da se Eisenmanov apstraktni model upotpuni informativnim centrom nastavak je trenda stvaranja umjetničkog spomenika kao mjes-

The project to build a central *Holocaust Monument* was initiated in 1988 by the association *Perspektive Berlin*. Elaborate institutional measures were designed to resolve dispute and establish consensus: petitions, signatures and donations were collected by associations, followed by a series of artistic competitions, parliamentary debates, discussion at the Enquete-Commission and the intervention of chancellors Helmut Kohl and Gert Schröder. The cancellation of the first competition in 1995 due to a lack of consensus over the short-listed models led to the introduction of additional institutional measures to build social consensus: three conferences involving over ninety experts and politicians in 1997, a second competition in 1998, exhibitions of blueprints and models of monuments, a series of six public hearings with the artists and architects early in 1998, meetings organized by church and political associations, as well as a series of sittings of the parliamentary cultural committee devoted to the monument in 1999.

Artists invited to submit proposals included Christian Boltanski, Gerhard Merz, Richard Serra in 1995; followed by Jochen Gerz, Rachel Whiteread and the architects Daniel Libeskind and Peter Eisenman in the second competition of 1997. 528 models were submitted in 1995 and 28 models (by invitation only) in 1997, which led to the selection of two winners in 1995 and four in 1997. Nevertheless, no agreement was reached over a single model. The shortlisting of multiple prizewinners, which offered the public an opportunity to become involved in the selection process and negotiate a more broadly based social consensus, in fact promoted conflict rather than consensus. Following the inconclusive outcome of the second competition in 1998, when neither the jury nor critics could agree on one of the four short-listed models, proposals were made to retain a modified version of Richard Serra's and Peter Eisenman's model, a field of columns between 0.5 and 7.5 metres in height, reduced from a total of 4000 to 2700 (Fig. 3). Moreover, all of the proposed modifications transgressed the initial principle of an abstract, purely sculptural monument by adding an institutional organization: Steven Spielberg's collection of witness accounts on video, known as the "Survivors of the Shoah Visual History Foundation" (proposed by Michael Naumann), a Holocaust museum (Lea Rosh), a University for Jewish Studies (Andreas Nachama), or a building contain-



<sup>3</sup> "Il faut destructurer le document pour déceler ses conditions de production". Jacques Le Goff, *La Nouvelle histoire* (1978), u Le Goff (izdanje) *La Nouvelle Histoire*, Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1988., s. 35-75, s. 63.

<sup>4</sup> Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (1966), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991., s. 72.

<sup>3</sup> "Il faut destructurer le document pour déceler ses conditions de production". Jacques Le Goff, *La Nouvelle histoire* (1978), in Le Goff (ed.), *La Nouvelle Histoire*, Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1988, pp. 35-75, p. 63.

<sup>4</sup> Peter Berger & Thomas Luckmann, *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (1966), Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991, p. 72

ta koje je povezano s informacijama i istraživačkim mogućnostima, uključujući usmenu i znanstvenu dokumentaciju. Čisti spomenik, kao estetski medij povijesti, tako je nadopunjen pedagoškim informacijama o povijesti i o drugim spomenicima smještenim na autentičnim lokacijama u Berlinu i oko njega. Dodavanje informativnog centra također bi osiguralo institucionalni nadzor nad umjetničkim elementom spomenika. Time njegovo značenje više ne bi moglo biti vođeno čistim estetskim zakonima. S obzirom na to da bi bio pod nadzorom zaklade *Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas* koju predstavljaju parlamentarni zastupnici, udruga, berlinski senat, židovska zajednica i ravnatelj postojećih povijesnih memorijalnih muzeja, značenje spomenika moglo bi se objasniti kao "dodavanje" znanstvenih spoznaja umjetnosti. Ako bi bilo potrebno, ovakvo objašnjenje također bi se s vremenom moglo modificirati u skladu s promijenjenom situacijom i suvremenim povijesnim shvaćanjem.

Postoji nekoliko čisto strukturalno političkih razloga zašto zadovoljavajuća odluka nije donesena bez političke intervencije prije početka (1988.) i približnog kraja rasprave (lipanj 1999.). Prvo, više uključenih institucija u proces odlučivanja, tri odborna tijela i sponzori - berlinski senat, parlamentarni odbor i udruga - otežali su postizanje jedinstvenog dogovora. Drugo, veliki broj prijavljenih natjecatelja. Treće, nejasna i otvorena priroda natječaja, koja je dovela do zajedničkih prvih nagrada te izložbi koje su isprovocirale nepomirljiva stajališta na konferencijama i u medijima. Četvrto, kontroverzna intervencija predsjednika Kohla koji je poništio prvi natječaj, kao i intervencija pri odabiru Eisenmanova i Serra modela u drugom natječaju, što je iznova potaklo kontroverze o predsjednikovoj intervenciji u redizajniranju i reinauguraciji spomenika Neue Wache 1993<sup>5</sup>. Peto, iako su mišljenja lokalnih i nacionalnih političara o spomeniku bila podijeljena i mimo njihove stranačke pripadnosti, nadolazeći parlamentarni izbori u rujnu 1998. godine pretvorili su spomenik u problem stranačke politike.

## Odaziv umjetnika i arhitekata na službeno natjecanje 1997. godine

Raspravu su karakterizirala dva središnja problema. Koji je najadekvatniji oblik spomenika? I je li spomenik kao "žanr" (za razliku od drugih oblika ritualne komemoracije kao što su, primjerice, polaganje vije-

ing a library, a branch of the Leo Baeck Institute and a research centre (Naumann/Eisenman). The final decision in June 1999 to complement Eisenman's abstract model with an information centre continued this trend towards the renunciation of an artistic monument in favour of a site linked to information and to research facilities including oral and scientific documentation. The pure monument, an aesthetic medium of history, was thus complemented with pedagogical information about history and about other memorials situated on authentic historical sites in and around Berlin. The addition of an information centre also ensured institutional control over the artistic element of the monument. Its meaning could no longer be governed by aesthetic laws alone. Under the control of the foundation *Stiftung Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas*, represented by members of parliament, associations, the Berlin Senate, the Jewish community and directors of existing historical memorial museums, the monument's meaning could be explained by "topping up" art with scientific knowledge. If necessary, such explanations could also be modified over time with respect to changing circumstances and contemporary historical understanding.

There are several purely structural political reasons why no satisfactory decision was reached without political intervention between the start (1988) and approximate end (June 1999) of the debate. First, the multiple institutions involved in the decision-making process, including the three commissioning bodies and sponsors — Berlin Senate, Bundestag committee and association — made it difficult to reach a unanimous agreement. Second, the large number of competition entries. Third, the inconclusive and open nature of the competitions, both leading to joint first prizes and exhibitions which provoked irreconcilable opinions in conferences and in the media. Fourth, the controversial intervention of Chancellor Kohl in the cancellation of the first competition and in the selection of the model by Eisenman and Serra in the second competition, which recalled the controversy over the chancellor's intervention in the redesign and reinauguration of the Neue Wache monument in 1993.<sup>5</sup> Fifth, although opinions towards the monument among both local and national politicians were divided regardless of their party allegiance, the approaching parliamentary elections of September 1998 increasingly polarised the monument into an issue of party politics.



<sup>5</sup> Službeni naziv "Središnji spomenik Savezne Republike Njemačke" posvećen "Žrtvama rata i tiranije"

<sup>5</sup> Official title: "Central Memorial of the Federal Republic of Germany", dedicated "To the Victims of War and Tyranny".

naca, demonstracije, javni govori ili državni praznici) učinkovit medij kolektivne komemoracije?<sup>6</sup> U svjetlu visokopolitiziranih okolnosti u kojima je nastao projekt *Spomenika holokaustu*, modele koji su odabrani tijekom natječaja 1995. i 1997. godine moramo promotriti s obzirom na njihov sadržaj i funkciju. Kako su umjetnici i arhitekti obrazložili svoj dizajn? I kako su kritičari odgovorili na dizajn i argumentaciju stvaralaca u svjetlu zahtjeva za konsenzusom i brzim okončanjem spora?<sup>7</sup> Politički uvjeti ustanovljeni u peticijama i u službenim instrukcijama za umjetnike tijekom desetogodišnje rasprave upućuju na to da izvor kontroverze nije u predloženim spomenicima, nego u nepomirljivim odnosima između uvjeta i medija koji je izabran da ih ispuni. U praksi, neke dosljednosti u motivima koji su zajednički različitim spomenicima iz užeg izbora sugeriraju da su umjetnički prijedlozi sadržavali potencijalni konsenzus o načinima komemoracije genocida u kamenu. Odbijanje žirija, političkih predstavnika, kritičara i šire javnosti da zajednički podrže bilo koji od motiva koje dijele nagradeni modeli može se pripisati teškoj zadaći “iskazivanja svih dimenzija masovnog ubojstva jednim spomenikom”<sup>8</sup>, iskazivanja onoga čija tematska općenitost zahtijeva apstraktni spomenik i neodređeni oblik sjećanja.

Nakon drugog natječaja proglašena su četiri pobjednika u studenom 1997.: prijedlog arhitekta Petera Eisenmanna i umjetnika Richarda Serre, prijedlozi umjetnika Jochena Gerza (slika 4) i arhitekata Daniela Libeskinda (slika 5) i Gesine Weinmiller (slika 6). Trebalo je izabrati samo jedan model. Politička funkcija predloženih modela spomenika odražavala se s obzirom na to kako pojedinci i država namjeravaju koristiti spomenik i kakav će biti njihov odnos prema njemu kao prema temelju simboličnog ugovora između države, umjetnika i pojedinaca. U praksi je velika raznolikost prijedloga spriječila društveni konsenzus zbog toga što su propisivali višestruke i često proturječne načine javne i državne upotrebe: različite načine kojima sjećanje pojedinca može biti integrirano u društveno sjećanje putem medija kolektivne komemoracije.

Primjerice, namjera Eisenmanova i Serrina polja kamenih ploča jest da izolira posjetitelja kako bi u njemu probudio osjećaj dezorijentacije i straha, dok prijedlog Libeskinda i Weinmillerove nudi otvoreni prostor za odmor, razmišljanje i razgovor. Pozivajući posjetitelje da odgo-

## Responses of Artists and Architects in the Official Competition of 1997

The debate was characterised by two central problems. What is the most adequate form of monument? And is the monument as a “genre” (in contrast to other forms of ritual commemoration such as wreath-laying, demonstrations, public speeches or national holidays, for example) an effective medium of collective commemoration?<sup>6</sup> In light of the highly politicised context in which the *Holocaust Monument* project evolved, we should therefore examine the models selected during the competitions of 1995 and 1997 in relation to both their form and function. How did the artists and architects justify their designs? And how did critics respond to the designs and to their creators’ arguments in light of the insistent demands for consensus and a rapid end to the debate?<sup>7</sup> The political conditions established in petitions and official instructions to artists during the ten-year long debate suggest that the source of controversy lay not in the proposed monuments themselves but in the incommensurable relation between the conditions and the medium chosen to fulfil them. In practice, some consistencies in the motifs shared by different shortlisted monuments suggest that the artistic proposals provided a potential formal consensus over the means of commemorating the genocide in stone. The reluctance of the jury, political representatives, critics and the wider public to collectively support any of the common motifs of the prizewinning models, however, may be imputed to the difficult task of “doing justice to all dimensions of the mass murder with a single monument”<sup>8</sup>, one whose thematic generality called for an abstract monument and a vague form of remembrance.

Following the second competition, four joint prize-winners were announced in November 1997: for the proposal by the architect Peter Eisenman and artist Richard Serra, and proposals by the artist Jochen Gerz (Fig. 4) and the architects Daniel Libeskind (Fig. 5) and Gesine Weinmiller (Fig. 6) respectively. One single model had to be selected. The political function of the proposed monumental forms was reflected in the ways in which individuals and the state were intended to use the monument, and how each related to it as the basis of a symbolic contract between the state, artist and individuals. In practice, the large variety of proposals hindered social consensus because they prescribed multiple and often incongruous types of public and state usage:



<sup>6</sup> Robert Kudielka, *Das falsche Gewicht der Betroffenen*, Freitag 37, 5. 9. 97., s. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Simpatizeri spomenika su upozoravali na političko “gubljenje obraza” kada je odgođen projekt nakon ustanovljene natječajne procedure. Vidi: Christian Meier, *Stachel im Fleisch*, Der Tagesspiegel 23.1.98, s. 23.

<sup>8</sup> Klaus Hartung, *Gedenken — aber wie?*, Die Zeit 24.3.95.

<sup>6</sup> Robert Kudielka, *Das falsche Gewicht der Betroffenen*, Freitag 37, 5.9.97, p. 13.

<sup>7</sup> Supporters of the monument warned of a political “loss of face” in the event of a cancellation of the project after the elaborate competition procedure. Cf. Christian Meier, *Stachel im Fleisch*, Der Tagesspiegel 23.1.98, p. 23.

<sup>8</sup> Klaus Hartung, *Gedenken — aber wie?*, Die Zeit 24.3.95.

vore na pitanje “zašto”, Gerzov model uključuje javnost u aktivnu konstrukciju nužno nedovršenoga spomenika. Svaki od ova tri modela propisuje specifičan tip društvenosti: radikalnu izolaciju, neobaveznu javnu komunikaciju, i formalno pismeno priznanje. Nadalje, teoretsko je stajalište umjetnika i arhitekata da je javnost kojoj se spomenik obraća neodređena, različito opisana kao nadnacionalna, nacionalna, i lokalna. Prema Gerzu spomenik bi se trebao obraćati “zajednici iznad nacije”<sup>9</sup>, premda ga opisuje “kao mjesto njemačkog identiteta”<sup>10</sup>. Michael Friedman iz Središnjeg židovskog vijeća Njemačke preciznije definira spomenik kao izraz lokalne kulture “za moj glavni grad”<sup>11</sup>. Lokalni odaziv na raspravu o spomeniku bio je pojačan dominacijom lokalnih nad državnim medijima u tretiranju ove teme i ključnom ulogom koju je odigrao berlinski senat odgađajući odluku nakon čega su uslijedila proturječna mišljenja lokalnih predstavnika vlasti i državne vlade 1998. godine. Neodlučnost je bila posljedica ne samo osjetljivog povijesnoga problema spomeničkoga predstavljanja kao takvog, nego i kompleksne federalne strukture donošenja političkih odluka u Njemačkoj.

Modeli koji su ušli u uži izbor također projiciraju veoma različita razmišljanja o državi. Libeskind opisuje svoj model kao “vrata u vladinu zonu”, spomenik koji “podržava državu” (“staatstragend”)<sup>12</sup>. Za razliku od njega, Eisenman tvrdi kako njegov model odolijeva državnim određenju<sup>13</sup>. Prema Eduardu Beaucampu, spomenik bi trebao “spriječiti neprikladne kolektivne rituale žalovanja, javne demonstracije, predstavljачke državne priredbe”.<sup>14</sup> Konačno, Gerz je namjeravao prebaciti odgovornost za stvaranje spomenika s umjetnika i države na javnost. Doveo je u pitanje tradicionalne razlikovne uloge povjerenstava i naručenoga umjetničkog djela koji je umjetnik izradio za specifičnu publiku. Poziv da se odgovori na pitanje “zašto” ne samo da pokreće kreativnu aktivnost publike zahtijevajući od nje da sastavi kolektivni tekst koji će biti uklesan u temelje spomenika, nego također demonstrira i slobodu suvremenih umjetnika koji, radeći prema narudžbi, nisu previše određeni sadržajem ili oblikom djela; to je ugovorni odnos koji Gerz definira kao “ne-naručeni”<sup>15</sup>. Njegovo, u osnovi političko razumijevanje uloge umjetnika, također ga je navelo da povuče svoj model s natječaja u srpnju 1998. navodeći kako nastavljanje kontroverzi oko projekta dokazuje nesposobnost države i društva da ispune uvjete narudžbe<sup>16</sup>.

different ways in which the memories of individuals may be integrated into social memory via the medium of collective commemoration.

The field of steles by Eisenman and Serra, for example, is intended to isolate visitors in order to arouse in them a sense of disorientation or fear, whereas the proposals of Libeskind and Weinmiller offer an open space in which to rest, reflect and talk. By inviting visitors to compose an answer to the question “why?”, Gerz’s model involves the public in the active construction of a necessarily incomplete monument. Each of these three models prescribes a specific type of sociability: radical isolation, casual public communication, and formal written testimony. Moreover, in theoretical statements of the artists and architects, the public to which the monument appeals is indeterminate, described variously as supranational, national or local. According to Gerz, the monument should appeal to “a community beyond the nation”<sup>9</sup>, although he describes it as “a place of German identity”<sup>10</sup>. Michel Friedman of the Central Council of Jews in Germany defined the monument more precisely as an expression of local culture, “for my capital city”.<sup>11</sup> The local appeal of the monument was reinforced by the dominance of local over national media in the treatment of this topic, and by the key role played by the Berlin Senate in postponing the decision following conflicts of opinion between local and national governments in 1998. Indecision was a consequence not only of the sensitive historical issue of monumentalisation as such, therefore, but also of the complex federal structure of political decision-making in Germany.

The shortlisted models likewise project very different assumptions about the state. Libeskind describes his model as a “gateway to the governmental zone”, a monument which is “supportive of the state” (“staatstragend”).<sup>12</sup> In contrast, Eisenman claims that his model resists state appropriation.<sup>13</sup> According to Eduard Beaucamp, it should “prevent inappropriate collective mourning rituals, public demonstrations, representative state occasions”.<sup>14</sup> Finally, Gerz attempted to displace responsibility for the creation of the monument from the artist and the state to the public. He brought into question the traditionally distinct roles of the commissioning authority and the commissioned work of art carried out by an artist for a specific audience. The invitation to answer the question “why?” not only delegates creative activity to the audience by requesting it to compose a collective text inscribed onto the concrete



<sup>9</sup> Gerz, *Materialien für die erste Beurteilungssitzung* (preneseno iz novina, studeni 1997.)

<sup>10</sup> Gerz, na javnom predstavljanju predloženog spomenika u Marstall Gallery, Berlin, 16.1.98.

<sup>11</sup> Michael Friedman, citirano iz *Furcht vor abstrakten Pfiffigkeiten*, Berliner Zeitung 21/22.3.98, s. 9

<sup>12</sup> Libeskind, na javnom predstavljanju predloženog spomenika u Marstall Gallery, Berlin, 19.1.98.

<sup>13</sup> Eisenman, na javnom predstavljanju predloženog spomenika u Marstall Gallery, Berlin, 13.1.98.

<sup>14</sup> Eduard Beaucamp, *Baut Serra!*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3. 2. 98. , s. 35.

<sup>15</sup> Gerz (intervju), *Das dekorative Gemeinwesen*, Die Tageszeitung 11. 4. 95.

<sup>9</sup> Gerz, *Materialien für die erste Beurteilungssitzung* (press release, November 1997).

<sup>10</sup> Gerz, at public presentation of proposed monument, Marstall Gallery, Berlin, 16.1.98.

<sup>11</sup> Michel Friedman, quoted in *Furcht vor abstrakten Pfiffigkeiten*, Berliner Zeitung 21/22.3.98, p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> Libeskind, at public presentation of proposed monument at Marstall Gallery, Berlin, 19.1.98.

<sup>13</sup> Eisenman, at public presentation of proposed monument at Marstall Gallery, Berlin, 13.1.98.

<sup>14</sup> Eduard Beaucamp, *Baut Serra!*, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 3.2.98, p. 35.

<sup>15</sup> Gerz, interview, *Das dekorative Gemeinwesen*, Die Tageszeitung 11.4.95.

Usprkos razlikama između predloženih načina korištenja tih spomenika od strane javnosti i države, oni ipak otkrivaju neke konzistentne formalne i semantičke motive koji sadržavaju potencijalnu osnovu za konsenzus o *Spomeniku holokaustu*. Većina otisaka predlaže plitku strukturu (Libeskindov prijedlog je iznimka). Gotovo svi modeli pokazuju različite stupnjeve apstrakcije izbjegavajući predstavljanje ljudske ili prirodne figure, a nijedan ne pridaje ozbiljnu pozornost inskripciji.<sup>17</sup> (Možda je znakovito za konsenzualnu prirodu apstrakcije da se za najapstraktniji odabrani model, Eisenmanovo i Serrino polje kamenih ploča, odlučilo posebno povjerenstvo i predsjednik). Za većinu su modela reference postojećih simbola i spomenika koje Gert Mattenklott naziva "spomenik nad spomenicima"<sup>18</sup> također znakovite. Libeskindov model, primjerice, služi kao simbolično žarište citata s najmanje pet već postojećih simbola u Berlinu: Židovskog muzeja, Reichstaga, Goetheova spomenika, Vile Wannsee i fasada gradskih kuća. Weinmillerin model prikazuje Davidovu zvijezdu, klasične hodočasnike ili čak Zid plača. Jakob-Marksov prijedlog imenovanja svih žrtava preuzima tehniku vijetnamskog veteranskog spomenika dok Gerzov princip, koji zahtijeva od građana da sami sastave tekst za spomenik, oponaša tehnike koje su već korištene za protu-spomenike u Bironu, Harburgu i Saarbrückenu.<sup>19</sup> Nadalje, modeli Eisenmana i Serrae, Gerza i Weinmillerove, sadrže elemente monolitnog oblika kao ironijsku reprodukciju i svi multipliciraju temeljne oblike tradicionalnoga skulpturalnoga spomenika.

Svim temama navednih modela zajednički je problem predstavljanja. U trećoj seriji konferencija 1997. godine na temu *Tipologija i ikonografija spomenika* rasprava se fokusirala na motiv praznine. "U srži njemačkog spomenika", rekao je James Young, "trebala bi biti praznina koju umjetnik treba predstaviti kao inspiraciju ili kao koncept."<sup>20</sup> Robert Kudielka je upozoravao na "lažni patos koji se javlja iz naklonosti spram praznine"<sup>21</sup> i mjesto toga zagovarao je primjer protu-spomenika koji komemorira prošlost istražujući sam proces komemoracije: "Naravno, to je pitanje "nepredstavljivoga", no to ne znači da moramo teatralno popustiti pred nemjerljivim, nego ... precizno artikulirati odnose između kapaciteta predstavljačkih sredstava i ograničenja njihovih mogućnosti."<sup>22</sup>

U praksi, jedino Gertz usvaja elemente žanra protu-spomenika, gdje ulična svjetilj-

base of the monument, but also demonstrates the freedom of contemporary artists to work for commissions which do not predetermine the content or form of the work, a contractual relationship which Gerz defines as a "non-commission".<sup>15</sup> His essentially political understanding of the role of the artist also led him to withdraw his model from the competition in July 1998 on the grounds that the continuing controversy over the project proved the failure of state and society to fulfil the conditions of a commission.<sup>16</sup>

In spite of the disparities between the proposed usages of these monuments by the public and the state, they reveal some consistent formal and semantic motifs which constitute a potential basis for consensus over the Holocaust Monument. Most blueprints propose a low-lying structure (Libeskind's is an exception). Almost all models demonstrate varying degrees of abstraction by avoiding the representation of human or natural figures, and none gave serious prior attention to an inscription.<sup>17</sup> (It is perhaps significant of the consensual nature of abstraction that the most abstract of the shortlisted models, the field of steles by Eisenman and Serra, was favoured by the specialist commission and by the chancellor.) Also consistent to most models were the composite references to existent symbols and monuments in what Gert Mattenklott calls "monuments of monuments".<sup>18</sup> Libeskind's model, for example, serves as a symbolic focal point for quotations of at least 5 existent symbols in Berlin: the Jewish Museum, the Reichstag, the Goethe memorial, the Wannsee villa and the facades of city houses. Weinmiller's model cites the Star of David, classical pillars or even the Wailing Wall. Jakob-Mark's proposal to name all victims adopts the technique of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial, while Gerz's principle of asking citizens to compose a script for the monument repeated a technique already used for counter-monuments in Biron, Harburg and Saarbrücken.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, the models of Eisenman and Serra, Gerz and Weinmiller all employ elemental monolithic forms as an ironic reproduction and multiplication of the basic form of traditional sculptural monuments.

The most consistent theme of these models is the problem of representation itself. In the third of a series of conferences in 1997, on the "Typology and Iconography of the Monument", discussion focused on the motif of emptiness. "At the core of a German monument," claimed James Young, "there should be an emptiness, which the



<sup>16</sup> Vidi: *Gerz zieht Entwurf zum Mahnmal zurück*, Berliner Zeitung 28. 7. 98. , s. 11.

<sup>17</sup> Samo su Ungers i Hans Hollein ugradili posvetu u svoje prijedloge. Nedostatak historijskog objašnjenja u obliku verbalnog komentara, teksta ili posvete dovodi do proizvoljnog značenja. Vidi: Jens Jessen, *Das undeutliche Mahnmal*, Berliner Zeitung 20. 1. 98.

<sup>18</sup> Gert Mattenklott, "Denk ich an Deutschland...", *Deutsche Denkmäler 1709 bis 1990*, Sekretariat für kulturelle Zusammenarbeit Nordrhein-Westfalen, Deutsche Nationaldenkmale 1790-1990, Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte 1993. s. 17-47.

<sup>19</sup> Vidi: James Young, *The Counter-Monument: Memory against Itself in Germany Today*, Critical Inquiry 2, 1992. , s. 267-296.

<sup>20</sup> Vidi: James Youngov komentar na trećem kongresu 1997. *Erinnerung, Gegenerinnerung und das Ende des Monuments*, u: *Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur, Colloquium: Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas*, Berlin: Copy-world 1997., s. 124-125.

<sup>21</sup> Vidi Kudielkov komentar na trećem kongresu 1997. s. 140-141.

<sup>22</sup> Kudielka, *Das falsche Gewicht der Betroffenheit*, Freitag 37, 5. 9. 97. s. 13.

<sup>16</sup> Cf. *Gerz zieht Entwurf zum Mahnmal zurück*, Berliner Zeitung 28.7.98, p. 11.

<sup>17</sup> Only Ungers and Hans Hollein incorporated inscriptions into their proposals. The absence of historical explanation in the form of verbal commentary, a text or inscription, would foster an arbitrary meaning. Cf. Jens Jessen, *Das undeutliche Mahnmal*, Berliner Zeitung 20.1.98, p. 4.

<sup>18</sup> Gert Mattenklott, *Denk ich an Deutschland ...*, *Deutsche Denkmäler 1790 bis 1990*, Sekretariat für kulturelle Zusammenarbeit Nordrhein-Westfalen (ed.), *Deutsche Nationaldenkmale 1790-1990*, Bielefeld: Verlag für Regionalgeschichte 1993, pp. 17-47, p. 46.

<sup>19</sup> Cf. James Young, *The Counter-Monument: Memory against Itself in Germany Today*, Critical Inquiry 2, 1992, pp. 267-296.

<sup>20</sup> See James Young's commentary at the third congress 1997, *Erinnerung, Gegenerinnerung und das Ende des Monuments*, in *Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (ed.), Colloquium: Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas*, Berlin: Copy-world 1997, pp. 124-125, p. 125.

<sup>21</sup> See Kudielka's commentary at the third congress 1997, *ibid.*, pp. 140-141, p. 141.

<sup>22</sup> Kudielka, *Das falsche Gewicht der Betroffenheit*, Freitag 37, 5.9.97, p. 13.



ka i betonski temelj funkcioniraju kao puka podrška za ispitivanje posjetitelja, čiji se odgovori snimaju. Oslobodivši se u cijelosti skulpturalnog oblika, ovaj prijedlog pruža alternativu, (ne-simboličku) retoričku bazu za konsenzus u neprekidnom propitivanju procesa komemoracije kao takvoga. Drugi modeli izravno predstavljaju odjeke pret hodnih teorijskih diskusija o praznini. Libeskind želi učiniti prazninu vidljivom i pobuđuje razmišljanje odlijevajući u beton prazni prostor ili "ništavilo" Židovskog muzeja s ciljem da "učini prazninu razumljivom"<sup>23</sup>, kako kaže jedan kritičar. Nadalje, svi ovi modeli betonskih panela i kamenih ploča Weinmillerove, Eisenmana i Serrae usko korespondiraju s definicijom spomenika palima - spomenik u obliku praznoga groba ili spomenik u sjećanje na izgubljene mrtve ili one koji su pokopani negdje drugdje.<sup>24</sup> Neki kritičari tvrde da čak iako su protu-spomenici utemeljeni na estetiци uzvišenoga, primjereno sjedinjenim senzibilnim efektima u skladu s konceptualizacijom predstavljanja,<sup>25</sup> ipak izravni poziv za aktivnim sudjelovanjem promatrača u neprekidnoj retoričkoj konstrukciji spomenika zapravo premješta svoj učinak s područja estetskog iskustva u racionalni konceptualizam njegove funkcije. Možemo također zaključiti da Spomenik holokaustu sadrži definiciju spomenika palima bez obzira na njegov određeni oblik sve dok obilježava zemljopisno mjesto sjećanja na mrtve ljude koji nisu pokopani na mjestu ovoga spomenika. Spomenik te vrste - prazan, apstraktan, u sjećanje na umrle, posvećen svim židovskim žrtvama genocida Drugoga svjetskoga rata, posvećen nečemu nepredstavljivom - jest možda arhitekturni prijevod uzvišenoga koji Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm definira terminima lažnosti, nedostatka (ljudskog) razmjera, apstrakcije, golemošću, i nepristupačnošću.<sup>26</sup> Motiv spomenika palima i, kao posljedica toga uzvišenoga inherentnog nekolicini projekata spomenika i samom projektu bez obzira na individualne modele, implicira da konsenzus o spomeniku pretpostavlja konsenzus o principima spomenika palima, bez obzira na njegov posebni oblik.

### "Nacionalni" spomenik?

Kada su se članovi udruženja *Perspektive Berlin* posebno založili za *Spomenik holokaustu*, pozvali su se ne samo na primjere drugih nacija, posebice *Yad Vashem* u Jeruzalemu i američki *Memorijalni muzej* holokaustu u Washingtonu, nego na sredstva izražavanja karakteristična za nacionalne

artist somehow has to represent as inspiration or as a concept".<sup>20</sup> Robert Kudielka warned against the "false pathos aroused by reverence towards emptiness",<sup>21</sup> however, and appealed instead to the example of counter-monuments which commemorate the past by exploring the very process of commemoration: "Of course, it's a question of the 'unrepresentable', but this does not mean that we have to theatrically give in to immeasurability, but to [...] articulate precisely the relation between the capacity of the means of representation and the limits of its adequacy."<sup>22</sup>

In practice, only Gerz incorporates elements of the counter-monument genre, where the lampposts and concrete base function as a mere support for questioning visitors and recording their responses. By dispensing almost entirely with sculptural form, this proposal provides an alternative (non-symbolic) *rhetorical* basis for consensus in the perpetual questioning of the process of commemoration as such. Other models directly echo the previous theoretical discussions on emptiness. Libeskind attempts to make emptiness visible and a spur to reflection by casting the empty spaces or "voids" of the Jewish Museum in concrete, with the aim (according to one critic) of "making emptiness intelligible".<sup>23</sup> Moreover, all these models, in particular the arrangements of concrete panels and steles by Weinmiller, Eisenman and Serra, correspond closely to the definition of a cenotaph — a monument in the form of an empty grave, or one in memory of lost dead people or those buried elsewhere.<sup>24</sup> Some critics argue that even counter-monuments are grounded in an aesthetics of the sublime, due to the renunciation of sensible effects in favour of the conceptualisation of representation,<sup>25</sup> although the direct appeal to the spectator's active participation in the continuous rhetorical construction of the monument in fact displaces its effect from the realm of aesthetic experience to the rational conceptualisation of its function. One could even argue that the Holocaust Monument conforms to the definition of a cenotaph regardless of its particular form, insofar as it marks a geographical site in memory of dead people *not* buried on the site of the monument. A monument of this sort — empty, abstract, in memory of absent dead, dedicated to all Jewish victims of the Second World War genocide, a representation dedicated to something unrepresentable — is perhaps an architectural translation of the sublime, which Dieter Hoffmann-Axthelm defines in terms of hollowiness, a lack of (human) scale, abstraction, enormity, and inaccessibility.<sup>26</sup> The motif of the ceno-



<sup>23</sup> Vidi: Harald Fricke, *Tote Monumente, lebendige Leere*, Die Tageszeitung (Magazin) 17/18. 1. 98.

<sup>24</sup> Vidi: Alan Borg, *War Memorials from Antiquity to the Present*, London: Leo Cooper 1991. , s. 75.

<sup>25</sup> Vidi: Mariam Niroumand, *Darsteller und Denklöcher*, Die Tageszeitung 14. 4. 97.

<sup>26</sup> Hoffmann-Axthelm utemeljuje svoju analizu na arhitektonskim teroijama Etiennea-Lousia Boulléa, *Die Ästhetik der Nichtzuständigkeit, Neue Gesellschaft für bildende Kunst, Der Wettbewerb für das Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas*, Berlin: Verlag der Kunst 1995., s. 74-83.; Vidi: Konrad Liessmann, *Auschwitz als Kunstgenuss*, Freitag 28. 2. 97. s. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. Harald Fricke, *Tote Monumente, lebendige Leere*, Die Tageszeitung (Magazin) 17/18.1.98, p. iv.

<sup>24</sup> Cf. Alan Borg, *War Memorials from Antiquity to the Present*, London: Leo Cooper 1991, p. 75.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Mariam Niroumand, *Darsteller und Denklöcher*, Die Tageszeitung 14.4.97, p. 15.

<sup>26</sup> Hoffmann-Axthelm bases his analysis on the architectural theories of Etienne-Louis Boullée, *Die Ästhetik der Nichtzuständigkeit, Neue Gesellschaft für bildende Kunst* (ed.), *Der Wettbewerb für das 'Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas*, Berlin: Verlag der Kunst 1995, pp. 74-83, p.79; cf. Konrad Liessmann, *Auschwitz als Kunstgenuß*, Freitag 28.2.97, p. 9.

pokrete XIX. stoljeća, na oblik komemoracije koji je bio moderan nakon Francuske revolucije, Napoleonskih ratova ili ujedinjenja Njemačke 1871. Anakronizam obojega - izabrana oblika (spomenik) i njegove simboličke mogućnosti (predstavnik nacije) - bili su primarni uzroci ponovljenog odgađanja ovoga projekta. Zašto su organizatori inzistirali na spomeniku radije nego na brojnim alternativnim oblicima historijske komemoracije: državnim govorima, ritualima, polaganju vijenaca, demonstracijama, godišnjim komemorativnim danima, ili primjerice, preimenovanju ulica? I zašto se pozivi za drugim oblicima komemoracija nisu ozbiljnije razmatrali? Nekoliko je kritičara zahtijevalo manji spomenik, želeći osnovati fond za preživjele, transferirati sredstva za ne-financirane, postojeće spomenike na mjestima koncentracijskih logora<sup>27</sup>. Organizatori Lea Rosh i Eberhard Jäckel pronašli su opravdanje za spomenik utemeljeno na činjenici da će Njemačka tako dugo trpjeti sramotu sve dok ne bude imala središnji spomenik koji se može usporediti s *Yad Vashemom* ili američkim *Memorijalnim muzejem holokausta*<sup>28</sup> čime sugeriraju kako njihova isključiva usredotočenost na potrebu za spomenikom nije utemeljena na političkoj ili kulturnoj nužnosti, nego na dogovoru koji je potkrijepljen uvjerenjem kako nacije zahtijevaju kamene spomenike i kako različite nacije trebaju imati iste načine kulturne reprezentacije. Odbijanje organizatora da osluhnu javna traženja alternativnih oblika komemoracije koherentno je njihovom isključivom odbijanju pojedinačne odgovornosti u području umjetnosti<sup>29</sup>; oni su se složili da je prenesena odgovornost za dizajn spomenika na umjetnicima i arhitektima utemeljena na striktnoj razlici između umjetnosti i politike.

Uvjet prema kojem bi spomenik trebao imati "središnji" simbolički značaj za Njemačku utjecao je na to da su dizajn, autorova obrana i kritički odjek bili popraćeni ne samo kontroverzama oko oblika spomenika, nego i zbog samog spomenika i političkih sredstava kojima se postizala odluka. Poništavanje prvoga natječaja u srpnju 1995., potom izvještaji kojima je predsjednik Kohl izrazio svoje negodovanje spram pobjedničkog modela opravdani su činjenicom da je nedostajao društveni konsenzus. Otad je konsenzus postao uvjet rješenja rasprave o spomeniku. "Diskusije o obliku središnjeg njemačkog *Spomenika holokaustu* u glavnom gradu" trebale bi slijediti, prema predsjednikovu glasnogovorniku, "cilj postizanja širokog konsenzusa među svim sudionicima"<sup>30</sup>. Poziv sudio-

taph and, by implication, the sublime, which is inherent to several of the monumental projects and to the project itself regardless of individual models, suggests that consensus over the monument presupposes consensus over the *principle* of a cenotaph, regardless of its particular form.

## A "National" Monument?

When members of the association *Perspektive* Berlin campaigned specifically for a Holocaust *monument*, they conformed not only to the example of other nations, in particular Yad Vashem in Jerusalem and the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, but to a means of expression characteristic of national movements of the nineteenth century, a form of commemoration favoured following the French Revolution, the Napoleonic Wars, or the unification of Germany in 1871. The anachronism of both the chosen form (a monument) and its symbolic potency (representative of the nation) were the prime causes of the repeated postponement of this project. Why did organisers insist on a monument rather than on numerous alternative forms of historical commemoration: state speeches, ritual wreath-laying ceremonies, demonstrations, annual commemorative days, or the renaming of streets, for example? And why were appeals for other forms of commemoration not given serious consideration? Several critics called for a smaller monument, the setting up of a charity foundation for survivors, the transfer of funds to underfunded existing memorials on the sites of concentration camps.<sup>27</sup> The justification of the monument by its organisers Lea Rosh and Eberhard Jäckel on the grounds that Germany would suffer "disgrace" so long as it did not possess a central monument comparable to Yad Vashem or the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum<sup>28</sup> suggests that their exclusive focus on the need for a monument was not based on political or cultural necessity, but on *convention*, sustained by the conviction that nations require stone monuments, and that different nations should possess the same modes of cultural representation. The refusal of organisers to yield to public demands for an alternative form of commemoration is coherent with their explicit denial of personal competence in the field of art;<sup>29</sup> their conventionality consisted in the delegation of responsibility for the design of the monument to artists and architects, based on the strict division of labour between art and politics.

The condition of a monument which should have "central" symbolic significance



<sup>27</sup> Vidi: Peter Michalzik, *Das Gedenken ist frei*, Süddeutsche Zeitung 9. 12. 97., s. 16.

<sup>28</sup> To je "temeljna ideja" koja stoji iza spomenika, prema Jäckelu. Vidi: E. Jäckel, *An alle und jeden erinnern*, Die Zeit, 7. 4. 89.

<sup>29</sup> Rosh na panel-diskusiji o predloženim modelima u Marstall Gallery, Berlin 20. 1. 98.; Jäckel u telefonskoj debati na radio-postaji Deutschlandfunk, 3. 8. 98.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. Peter Michalzik, *Das Gedenken ist frei*, Süddeutsche Zeitung 9.12.97, p. 16.

<sup>28</sup> This is the "basic idea" behind the monument, according to Jäckel. See E. Jäckel, *An alle und jeden erinnern*, Die Zeit, 7.4.89.

<sup>29</sup> Rosh in a panel discussion of proposed models in the Marstall Gallery, Berlin, 20.1.98; Jäckel in a telephone debate on Deutschlandfunk radio, 3.8.98.

nicima na drugi službeni natječaj 1997. bio je, kao posljedica toga, formuliran u gotovo napadno suglasnim nacionalnim terminima: Spomenici svake države utjelovljuju iskustvo te nacije, njezinu samoidealizaciju, političke prilike i estetske tradicije. Zbog tog razloga postoje značajne razlike između oblika spomenika u Americi, Poljskoj, Izraelu ili Nizozemskoj. ... Njemački spomenik ubijenim europskim Židovima nužno će definirati vlastito, sadašnje, njemačko pamćenje holokausta kao kompleksno i teško sjećanje.”<sup>31</sup>

Natječaj iz 1997. godine je stoga od početka bio opterećen ideološkim teretom: zahtjevom da jedan spomenik utjelovi cjelokupno nacionalno sjećanje na genocid nad Židovima i inzistiranjem na potrebi za konsenzusom. U oba slučaja, ljudi koji bi se trebala identificirati sa spomenikom i stoga angažirati u dobivanju komunalnog pristanaka nisu opisani kao prosudbeno tijelo, žiri stručnjaka, mjesna zajednica ili specifična generacija, nego kao nacija. Taj projekt je osvjetlio neodređenost društvenog prihvaćanja političkih simbola: može li nacija biti ustanovljena kao koherentna zajednica koja se “identificira sa ili se veže, u smislu emotivne privrženosti, uz pojedinačni središnji simbol? Jesu li spomenici, pa čak i monumentalnost, još uvijek politički legitimni oblici kulturnog izraza u 1990.?”

## Dijalog onkraj fiksiranja spomenika

Potruga za prikladnim umjetničkim i arhitektonskim oblicima spomenika te rasprava o tome potakli su pitanje o značenju genocida Drugoga svjetskog rata za suvremeno nacionalno samorazumijevanje ili “identitet” u Njemačkoj. Kao rezultat tog proturječja, projekt ovoga spomenika ima svoju vlastitu povijest. Moguće je čak da će manje predstavljati svjedočanstvo žrtvama genocida, a više svjedočanstvo teškoće odabira i usuglašavanja oko odgovarajućih oblika komemoracije. Nemogućnost postizanja konsenzusa o *Spomeniku holokaustu*, unatoč zajedničkim motivima prijedloga iz 1995. i 1997., može se pripisati kompleksnosti institucionaliziranog procesa odlučivanja, različitim pojedincima i propisanom načinu na koji će država koristiti modele, ali i načelu središnjeg nacionalnog simbola. Uvjeti kampanje i problemi debate pokazuju da je neuspjeh u postizanju socijalnog konsenzusa o *Spomeniku holokaustu* djelomično posljedica prisilne prirode zahtjeva za konsenzusom. Poziv za

for Germany ensured that the designs, their authors’ justifications and critical responses were accompanied by controversy not only over the form of the monument, but over the very necessity of a monument as such, and over the political means of reaching a decision. The annulment of the first competition in July 1995, following reports that Chancellor Kohl had expressed disapproval of the prizewinning model, was justified on the grounds that social consensus was lacking. From this moment, consensus became the sole condition for a conclusion to the debate over the monument. “The discussion over the form of the central German Holocaust Monument in the capital city should,” according to the chancellor’s spokesman, be “pursued with the aim of achieving broad consensus among all participants”.<sup>30</sup> The invitation to participants in the second official competition of 1997 was consequently formulated in almost oppressively consensual, national terms: “The monuments of each country embody the experiences of this nation, its self-idealisation, the political necessities and aesthetic traditions. For this reason, there are remarkable differences between forms given to monuments in America, Poland, Israel or Holland. [...] Germany’s national monument for the Murdered Jews of Europe will necessarily define Germany’s own present memory of the Holocaust, a complex and difficult memory.”<sup>31</sup>

The competition of 1997 was therefore handicapped from the start by an ideological burden: the demand that a single monument embody the whole nation’s memory of genocide against Jews, and the insistence on the need for consensus. In both cases, the *scope* of the group of people presumed to identify with the monument and therefore engage in communal “consent” was described not in terms of members of the commissioning body, the jury of specialists, the local community or a specific generation, for example, but as the *nation*. This project highlighted the indeterminate social appeal of political symbols: can a nation be conceived as a coherent community which “identifies” with or engages in a sense of emotional allegiance with a single central symbol? Are monuments and even monumentality still politically legitimate forms of cultural expression in the 1990s?

## Dialogue Beyond Memorial Fixation

The search for an appropriate artistic architectural form of memorial and the ensuing debate have raised questions about the significance of the Second World War geno-



<sup>30</sup> *Kanzler Kohl lehnt Berliner Entwurf ab*, Frankfurter Rundschau, 1. 7. 95., s. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Vidi: Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur, Künstlerische Wettbewerb *Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas* (instrukcije za sudionike natječaja iz 1997. godine), Berlin 1997.

<sup>30</sup> *Kanzler Kohl lehnt Berliner Entwurf ab*, Frankfurter Rundschau, 1.7.95, p. 1.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Senatsverwaltung für Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (ed.), *Künstlerischer Wettbewerb Denkmal für die ermordeten Juden Europas* (instructions for participants in the competition of 1997), Berlin 1997.

“središnjim”, nacionalnim spomenikom u inicijalnim peticijama, uputstvima natječaja i u diskusijama koje su uslijedile nakon poništenja prvog natječaja 1995. stvorio je nepomirljivu razliku između očekivanih političkih uvjeta i estetskog medija koji je nužan za realizaciju tih uvjeta. Može li apel za “središnjim” “nacionalnim” spomenikom biti zadovoljen na samo jednom mjestu? Iako su arhitekti na natječaju fokusirali javnu pozornost na specifična pitanja oblika, korijen proturječja zapravo leži u društvenim, političkim i moralnim pretpostavkama spomenika. Otpor projektu potaknut je ne samo neadekvatnošću medija s obzirom na temu (ne zato što nije ovladano tehničkim sredstvima kojima bi se moglo realistično prikazati genocid) nego:

1. zato što redukcija historijskih događaja (čime se nadilazi mašta) na pojedinačni, uglavnom apstraktni oblik (bez dokumentarističkih dokaza) ruši historiografski tabu, imajući za posljedicu nepoštovanje objektivnosti, čime se potiče relativizam<sup>32</sup>, kako u interpretaciji, tako i u ideološkoj upotrebi spomenika;
2. zato što uvjet središnjeg i nacionalnog nadilazi kapacitet pojedinog simbola koji općenito treba komemorirati holokaust; peticije udruženja *Perspektive Berlin* iz 1998. nazivaju nacionalni spomenik “dužnošću svih Nijemaca, na Istoku kao i na Zapadu”<sup>33</sup> i to opterećuje pojedinačni objekt ogromnim političkim zadatkom;
3. zato što dvojbeno središnje mjesto proturječi dugotrajnoj politici decentraliziranja historijskih spomenika u Njemačkoj. Taj projekt je ugušen ne samo zbog problema njegova oblikovanja, nego i zbog dvojbene potrebe za centralnim simbolom.

Zahtjev za središnjim, nacionalnim spomenikom, također budi pitanje: “Središnje prema čemu?” i “Tko pripada naciji?” Termini kojima je vođena rasprava o ovom spomeniku izazivaju nas da definiramo kako “identitet” ili samorazumijevanje može biti utemeljeno u sjećanju na genocid (koje se smjenom generacija uglavnom održava verbalnim oblicima, vizualnim i auditivnim medijima). Može li društvo konstruirati identitet na temelju osjećaja naslijedene sramote? Ili bi se umjesto toga trebalo fokusirati na simbole koji potiču historijsko razumijevanje implementacije kriminala (izložba *Topografija terora*) ili na višestruke oblike otpora kriminalu (kao spomenik njemačkom otporu u Berlinu)? I ne potiče li pokušaj simbolizacije nacionalnog identiteta, na temelju emotivnih veza koje proizlaze

for contemporary national self-understanding or “identity” in Germany. As a result of the controversy, the project for this monument has a history of its own. It is even possible that it will stand less as testimony to the victims of genocide than as testimony to the difficulty of selecting and agreeing upon an adequate form with which to commemorate them. The failure to achieve consensus over the Holocaust Monument in spite of the common motifs of proposals submitted in 1995 and 1997 may be imputed to the complexity of the institutional decision-making process, to the differing individual and state usages prescribed by the models, but also to the principle of a central, national symbol. The conditions of the campaign and issues of debate suggest that the failure to reach social consensus over the Holocaust Monument was partly due to the coercive nature of the very demand for consensus. The call for a “central”, “national” monument in the initial petitions, competition instructions, and in discussions following the annulment of the first competition in 1995 created an irreconcilable discrepancy between the expected political *conditions* and the aesthetic *medium* required to realise these conditions. Can the appeal for a “central” and “national” monument be fulfilled in a single site? Even though the architectural competitions focused public attention on the specific question of form, the root of the controversy in fact lay in the social, political and moral presuppositions of the monument. Resistance to the project was triggered not only by the inadequacy of the aesthetic medium to the subject matter (not because the technical means to “represent” genocide realistically had not been mastered, therefore), but (1) because the reduction of a historical event (which exceeds our imagination) to a single, largely abstract, form (without documentary evidence) breaks a historiographical taboo, entailing a disregard for objectivity which could foster relativism,<sup>32</sup> both in the interpretation and ideological usage of the monument; (2) because the conditions of centrality and nationality surpass the capacity of a *single* symbol to commemorate the Holocaust in *general*; petitions of the association *Perspektive Berlin* from 1988 called for a national monument as a “duty for all Germans in East and West,”<sup>33</sup> and thus burdened a single object with an incommensurable political task; (3) because the conspicuous central site contradicted a longstanding policy of constructing decentral historical memorials in Germany. This project was hampered not only by the problem of form, therefore, but by the doubtless necessity of a central symbol.



<sup>32</sup> Vidi: Saul Friedländer, *Probing the Limits of Representation. Nazism and the “Final Solution”*, Cambridge Mass & London: Harvard University Press, 1992., s. 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Perspektive Berlin, “Aufwurf”*, Frankfurter Rundschau, 30. 1. 89.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Saul Friedländer (ed.), *Probing the Limits of Representation. Nazism and the ‘Final Solution’*, Cambridge Mass. & London: Harvard University Press, 1992, p. 6ff.

<sup>33</sup> *Perspektive Berlin, “Aufwurf”*, Frankfurter Rundschau, 30.1.89, p. 4.

iz kolektivnog osjećaja krivice, stupanj samodopadnosti zahvaljujući jednostavnoj činjenici da sublimira emocionalnu (iako problematičnu) vezu uz prošlu konstrukciju nacionalne zajednice u sadašnjosti? Nekoćina kritičara je izrazila sumnje o *Spomeniku holokaustu* u tom kontekstu. Hotimično provokativna optužba Eike Geiselna da "čak i mrtvi Židovi mogu poslužiti za povezivanje nacije"<sup>34</sup> zapravo ponavlja široko rasprostranjenu kritiku *Spomenika holokaustu* kao oblika "alibija" koji "delegira"<sup>35</sup> sjećanje kao objekt, tako da je značaj onih događaja kojih se sjeća podređen suvremenoj sebičnosti komemoracije. Spomenici su oblici socijalnih konvencija koje neizbježno historiziraju događaje reizgrađujući ih na način zajednički svim drugim monumentaliziranim događajima različitih historijskih razdoblja. Osim rasprave o obliku spomenika, nema rješenja fundamentalnog konflikta između oni koji su "za" i onih "protiv" same ideje i realizacije središnjeg *Spomenika holokaustu*. S druge strane, netko će možda pozdraviti projekt izgradnje spomenika iz pedagoških razloga jer provocira prosvjetljeniju javnu raspravu. Ipak, skeptici smatraju da će jednom kad se izgradi spomenik, prestati i rasprava. James Yung, član natječajnog žirija kojega se smatra stručnjakom za to pitanje tvrdi kako rasprava o obliku i načinima komemoracije sama po sebi nije odgovarajuće sredstvo komemoracije jer je preuzeta iz historijskih činjenica. Nadalje, on tvrdi da će spomenik (ako je otvoren i apstraktan) provocirati diskusije i nakon podizanja<sup>36</sup>. No Young precjenjuje politički utjecaj ovoga pojedinačnog spomenika. Javna diskusija o genocidu je etički imperativ koji je čest kada su posrijedi javni spomenici, ali nije ovisan o njihovom prisustvu. Berlinski spomenik, jednom sagrađen, stajat će i djelovati zajedno s drugim javnim forumima, uključujući originalna historijska mjesta u gradu, izložbe, muzeje, obrazovne institucije, knjige, novine, film, književnost, kao i usmene oblike historijske i privatne transmisije sjećanja.

Opetovano otkazivanje projekta 1995. pa 1998. i nemogućnost postizanja društvenog konsenzusa o obliku spomenika govore o neprimjerenosti pojedinačnog spomenika kao izraza kolektivne nacionalne svijesti. Rasprave između političara, umjetnika, arhitekata, novinara i intelektualaca u novinama i na javnim susretima nisu kulminirale u prilog pojedinom dizajnu. Samo

The call for a central, national monument also raises the questions: "central to what?" and "who belongs to the nation?" The terms in which the debate over this monument were conducted challenge us to define how "identity" or self-understanding may be founded on the memory of genocide (which, with the passing of generations, is now increasingly sustained by forms of verbal, visual and auditive media). Can a society construct an identity on the basis of a sense of inherited shame? Or should it focus instead on symbols which also foster a historical understanding of the implementation of the crimes (as in the exhibition *Topographie des Terrors*) or of the multiple forms of resistance to the crimes (as in the German Resistance Memorial in Berlin)? And does not the attempt to symbolise national identity on the basis of emotional bonds derived from a sense of collective guilt foster a degree of complacency by the mere fact that it subsumes this emotional (albeit problematical) attachment to the past to the construction of a national common bond in the present? Several critics expressed doubts about the Holocaust Monument in these terms. Eike Geisel's deliberately provocative claim that "even dead Jews may serve to bind the national collective"<sup>34</sup> echoes widespread critiques of the Holocaust Monument as a form of "alibi" which "delegates"<sup>35</sup> memory to objects, such that the significance of the remembered events is subordinate to the contemporary expediency of commemoration. Monuments are a form of social convention which inevitably historicise events by rendering them in a mode common to all other monumentalised events of different historical periods.

Beyond the debate over the form of the monument, there remains no solution to the more fundamental conflict between those who are "for" and those "against" the very idea and realisation of a central Holocaust Monument. On the one hand, one may welcome the project to build the monument for pedagogical reasons because it provokes enlightening public debate. On the other hand, sceptics suggest that, once realised, such debate will cease. James Young, a member of the jury during the competition procedure, who is widely considered to be an expert on this question, claims that the *debate* over forms and means of commemoration is in itself not an adequate means to implement an enlightening commemoration because it detracts from the historical facts. Moreover, he claims that the monument (if open and abstract) will continue to provoke discussion after its erection.<sup>36</sup> But Young



<sup>34</sup> Eike Geisel, *Lebenshilfe von toten Juden*, Junge Welt 14. 5. 94.

<sup>35</sup> Stefanie Endlich, *Gedenkstätten und Gedenkort in Berlin* u: S. Endlich & Thomas Lutz, *Gedenken und Lernen an historischen Orten*, Edition Hentrich, Berlin 1995. , s. 9 - 15.

<sup>36</sup> James Young, *At Memory's Edge. After - Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture*, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 2000. , s. 195.

<sup>34</sup> Eike Geisel, *Lebenshilfe von toten Juden*, Junge Welt 14.5.94.

<sup>35</sup> Stefanie Endlich, *Gedenkstätten und Gedenkort in Berlin*, in S. Endlich & Thomas Lutz, *Gedenken und Lernen an historischen Orten*, Berlin: Edition Hentrich 1995, pp. 9-15, p. 14.

<sup>36</sup> James Young, *At Memory's Edge. After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture*, New Haven & London, Yale University Press, 2000, p. 195.

je intervencija parlamenta učinila odluku praktičnom. *Spomenik holkaustu* u Berlinu stoga je politički spomenik samorazumijevanju parlamenta Savezne Republike Njemačke u lipnju 1999., a ne trajni izraz "njemačkog" priznavanja patnji koje su prouzročili židovskim žrtvama genocida u Drugom svjetskom ratu. To je socijalni spomenik samo ukoliko djeluje kao katalizator javnog dijaloga o sredstvima sjećanja i predstavljanja ovoga događaja.

No možemo zahvaliti dijalogu i sumnjama koje su pratile ovaj spomenik što projekt nije uspio kulminirati čistom odlukom o tome kakav oblik bi trebao imati i kako izgraditi spomenik koji bi naglasio neusporedivost historijske reprezentacije i historijskih činjenica. Projekt je prevelik - fizički (kao da se veliki kriminal može kompenzirati velikim spomenikom) i emotivno (na granici patosa). Tijekom rasprave, nacionalni spomenik je trebao steći status apsolutnog, ako ne i nacionalnog spomenika za sva vremena. On odražava idelanu holističku tvrdnju o naciji koja ne može prigriliti kompleksnost te teme, koju pak može svladati samo detaljna dokumentacija.

Kada se Walter Jens javno usprotivio projektu u veljači 1998. govoreći: "*Lako je govoriti o smrti milijuna - no kako je Selma Kohn otišla u plinsku komoru?*"<sup>37</sup> on je time osvijetlio esencijalnu proturječnost između historije i njezina medija, između činjenice historijskog iskustva i ideala, ideološke funkcije nametnute pojedinačnom, navodno nacionalnom spomeniku.

ožujak 2001.

prijevod / translation: Suzana Jukić

overestimates the political impact of this single monument. Public discussion over genocide is an ethical imperative that frequently takes place in relation to public monuments, but which is by no means dependent on their presence. The Berlin monument, once built, will stand alongside and operate in conjunction with many other public forums including original historic sites in the city, exhibitions, museums, educational institutions, books, journalism, films, literature as well as oral forms of historical transmission and private (family) remembrance.

The repeated cancellations of the project in 1995 and 1998, and the unfeasibility of building social consensus over the form of the monument, testify to the unsuitability of a single monument as an expression of collective national sentiment. Debate between politicians, artists, architects, journalists and intellectuals in the press and at public meetings failed to culminate in a clear preference for a single design. Only the intervention of parliament made a decision practicable. The Holocaust Monument in Berlin is therefore a political monument to the self-understanding of the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany in June 1999, not an enduring expression of "German" acknowledgement of the suffering caused to Jewish victims of the genocide of the Second World War. It is a social monument only insofar as it acted as a catalyst of public dialogue about the means of remembering and representing this event.

Yet we may welcome the dialogue and doubts surrounding this monument, for the failure of the project to culminate in a clear decision over what form and whether to build the monument underlines the incommensurability of historical representation and historical facts. The project is too big — both physically (as if a big crime is compensated by a big monument) and emotionally (bordering on pathos). During the debate, this national monument acquired a status as an absolute, if not as *the* national monument for all time. It reflects an ideal holistic notion of nationhood which cannot accommodate the historical complexity of its theme, which only detailed documentation can convey. When Walter Jens publicly opposed the project in February 1998 by asking the question "*It is easy to talk about the death of millions — but how did Selma Kohn go into the gas?*"<sup>37</sup> he highlighted an essential incongruity between history and its medium, between the facts of historical experience and the ideal, ideological function imposed on this single, allegedly national monument.

March 2001

→ **Peter Carrier** - predaje kulturne i rodne studije na Srednjoeuropskom sveučilištu u Budimpešti. Njegovo istraživanje usredotočuje se na spomenike i kulture pamćenja u Francuskoj i Njemačkoj. Objavio je nekoliko članaka o kolektivnom pamćenju i umjetnostima.

Peter Carrier - teaches Culture and Gender Studies at the Central European University Budapest. His research focuses on monuments and memory cultures in France and Germany. He has published several articles on collective memory and the arts.